Strategic patenting is widely believed to raise the costs of innovating, especially in industries characterised by cumulative innovation. This paper studies the effects of strategic patenting on R&D, patenting and market value in the computer software industry. We focus on two key aspects: patent portfolio size which affects bargaining power in patent disputes, and the fragmentation of patent rights (.patent thickets.) which increases the transaction costs of enforcement. We develop a model that incorporates both effects, together with R&D spillovers. Using panel data for the period 1980-99, we find evidence that both strategic patenting and R&D spillovers strongly affect innovation and market value of software firms.
Introduction
There is an extensive empirical literature demonstrating that R&D creates positive technology spillovers that contribute to innovation and productivity. This consensus underpins the justi…cation for government R&D-support policies. At the same time, however, there is a growing concern that the patenting of innovations is itself becoming an impediment to the innovation process. The argument is that strategic patenting activity creates patent thickets that constrain …rms'freedom of action in R&D and thus raise the costs of innovation. The dangers of patent thickets are frequently raised in public debates on patent reform -for example, National Research Council (2004).
The concerns have been intensi…ed by the acceleration in patenting over the past two decades, especially in high tech industries. During the period 1976-1996, the total number of patent applications in the U.S. grew at an average annual rate of 1.8 percent. The growth accelerated from the mid-1980s, when there was a pro-patent shift associated with the establishment of the specialized Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and other developments (Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Ja¤e and Lerner, 2004) . In the period 1986-1996, aggregate patenting grew at 3.5 percent annually. This growth was particularly rapid in high tech industries -for example, 4.0 percent in pharmaceuticals, 7.1 in medical instruments, 9.3 in biotechnology, 11.0 in semiconductors and 11.2 percent in software. The growth in software patenting was due in part to recent judicial decisions during this period that limited the scope of software copyright protection, and extended the patentability of software (in particular algorithms not embedded in hardware).
There is evidence that …rms, especially in high-tech industries, try to resolve patent disputes by cross licensing agreements, patent pools and other cooperative mechanisms (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004) . The importance of such mechanisms is greatest in complex technology industries where innovation is cumulative, building on component innovations from di¤erent …rms (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2003a Ziedonis, , 2003b . In such industries, it is a widely held view that patenting activity creates a 'thicket'of fragmented property rights that impedes R&D activity by constraining the ability of …rms to operate without extensive licensing of complementary technologies. This position was …rst enunciated by Heller and Eisenberg (1998) , who labelled it the 'problem of the anti-commons.' 1 By increasing the transaction costs of R&D, patent thickets provide an incentive for …rms to patent defensively. In e¤ect, this argument implies that patenting creates a negative externality on other …rms: by increasing the …rm's bargaining power in the form of more 'chits to trade' in patent disputes, patenting by one …rm raises the cost to other …rms of protecting or appropriating the rents from their innovations. Some authors have claimed that this creates a prisoner's dilemma which can lead to excessive patenting in complex technology industries, including semiconductors and software (Bessen and Maskin, 2000) .
Strategic patenting encompasses two conceptually distinct issues, which have not always been sharply distinguished in the literature. The …rst involves the link between patent portfolio size and bargaining power. Having a larger patent portfolio puts a …rm in a better position to bargain with other …rms when patent disputes arise. More 'patent chits' mean greater bargaining power and thus more favourable outcomes in the resolution of patent disputes. The second aspect involves the link between transaction costs and the number of potential disputants. When a …rm faces many …rms with whom patent disputes may arise, transaction costs rise. Moreover, since disputes are normally resolved bilaterally (not collectively), having to deal with many disputants makes bargaining failures more likely and creates the 'complements problem'-value maximisation requires coordinated resolution which is ignored by independent claimants (Shapiro, 2001 ).
Despite widespread concern over the issue, the econometric evidence on the e¤ects of patent thickets is limited. The two leading empirical studies are Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2003a) , both of which focus on the semiconductor industry. The Hall and Ziedonis study shows that patenting rose sharply in the 1990's (after controlling for R&D and other factors), especially for capital intensive semiconductor …rms. While indirect, this evidence is consistent with defensive patenting and patent thickets, since the danger of ex post holdup would be greater for such …rms. Ziedonis (2003b) tests the hypothesis more directly by examining the relationship between …rm-level patenting and a measure of the fragmentation of patent rights. She …nds that patenting is higher (in the cross section of …rms) when …rms face greater fragmentation (lower concentration) 1 For opposing views on the dangers of patent thickets in software, see Lessig (2001) and Mann (2005) . Merges (1996 Merges ( , 1999 has been a leading voice arguing that …rms …nd ways to contract around patent thickets. Walsh, Arora and Cohen (2003) and Walsh, Cho and Cohen (2005) present supporting survey evidence in the context of biomedical research activity.
of patent rights among rival …rms. Both of these papers focus exclusively on the impact of patent thickets on patenting behaviour. The impact of patent thickets on the R&D decision and the market valuation of …rms remains unexplored. In addition, there is a need for a formal analytical model that generates testable predictions about the impact of strategic patenting -both patent portfolio size and the fragmentation of patent rights. 2 This paper studies the impact of strategic patenting by technology rivals on the R&D spending, patenting and market value of …rms in the computer software industry. Like semiconductors, software is a classic example of a complex technology in which cumulative innovation plays a central role. In this paper we incorporate both aspects of strategic patenting -portfolio size to capture the bargaining power, and fragmentation of patent rights to capture the transaction costs of enforcing patent rights. We develop a model that allows us identify the two negative externalities from patenting, as well as the positive technology spillovers from R&D. All three externalities are related to the …rm's proximity to other …rms in technology space. We measure technology proximity using information on the distribution of the citations contained in a …rm's patents to di¤erent technology classes. In the empirical speci…cation of the model, we follow the approach developed in Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2005) , using multiple indicators of performance (market value, patents and R&D) in order to help identify the three types of externalities in which we are interested.
Using panel data on 'software …rms' in the U.S. during 1980-99, we …nd evidence of both strategic patenting and R&D spillovers. There are three key …ndings. First, greater patenting activity by technology rivals signi…cantly reduces the …rm's market value, patenting and R&D. We interpret this …nding as indicating the importance of bargaining power in resolving patent disputes.
Second, we …nd that higher concentration (less fragmentation) of patent rights -which corresponds to lower transaction costs -is associated with higher market value, but lower R&D and patenting activity. The third …nding is that R&D spillovers signi…cantly increase patenting and market value, controlling for the …rm's stock of R&D. These three …ndings are all consistent with the predictions of the model. Finally, we also …nd that there is a large 'patent premium'in the stock market for 2 While not speci…cally testing the patent thickets hypothesis, in an unpublished empirical paper Bessen and Hunt (2003) argue that software patenting has actually reduced the level of R&D. This highly controversial paper has been sharply criticised by Hahn and Wallsten (2003) . these software …rms, controlling for the stock of R&D and other factors. Calculations suggest that this patent premium accounts for about 20 percent of the private return to R&D for these software …rms.
Before proceeding we want to emphasise that, in addition to technology (or knowledge) spillovers, R&D can also create a product market rivalry or business stealing e¤ect. 3 In a recent paper, Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (BSV, 2005) develop a methodology for distinguishing between technology spillovers and product market rivalry and apply it to a large panel of U.S. …rms. Their identi…cation strategy relies on two features: …rst, using distinct measures for distance between …rms in the technology and product market spaces, and second, using multiple outcome measures that are a¤ected by spillovers and product market rivalry (namely, R&D, patents and market value).
As pointed out above, the current paper follows BSV in exploiting these three outcome measures.
However, the objective of the current paper is very di¤erent in that we want to identify the e¤ects of strategic patenting in the context of technology spillovers. To keep the framework tractable, we do not incorporate product market rivalry into the model or the empirical analysis. In principle, it should be possible to construct an emcompassing model that includes strategic product market rivarly as well as strategic patenting e¤ects, but we do not do that here. On the empirical side, the current paper focuses on software …rms (whereas the BSV paper studies a wide range of manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries). If demand complementarities are especially important in software, as many believe, then it may prove empirically di¢ cult to isolate product market rivalry e¤ects in this industry, but that question is beyond the scope of this paper.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model (details are in Appendix 1) and summarises the empirical predictions. In Sections 3 and 4 we describe the data set and the construction of the strategic patenting and technology spillover variables. Section 5 presents the econometric speci…cation of the three equations in the model -market value, patenting and R&D. The empirical results and their implications are discussed in Section 6. 3 The earliest attempt to distinguish technology spillovers and product market rivalry is Ja¤e 1988. Branstetter and Sakikabara (2002) study the issue in the context of research consortia. For a theoretical and empirical analysis of these issues, see Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2005) .
Analytical Framework
A …rm (say, …rm 0) produces knowledge by investing in R&D, but it also may bene…t from technology spillovers from …rms that are close in technology space (technology rivals, denoted by ).
The knowledge production function is k 0 = (r 0 ; r ): Its technology rivals have a similar knowledge production function, k = (r ; r 0 ): We assume that is non-decreasing and concave in both arguments. When a …rm makes its R&D decision, it recognises that it generates as well as receives technology spillovers.
The …rm chooses the fraction of its knowledge that it protects by patenting ('patent propensity').
We let 2 (0; 1) denote the patent propensity and 1 denote patent e¤ectiveness, i.e., the appropriation of rents from a given innovation if it patented relative to the rents if it is not patented.
Thus 1 represents the patent premium.
The …rm has a variable pro…t function de…ned over prices of variable inputs, w, and the stock of knowledge, k 0 , which we denote by ( 0 k 0 ; w) where 0 = 0 + (1 0 ): The pro…t function is increasing and concave in k 0 , and decreasing and convex in w: For notational simplicity we suppress the input prices in what follows.
Patenting is costly. The unit cost of a patent includes a …xed administrative fee denoted by f , and a patent enforcement cost denoted by H: Enforcement costs depend on two features of the patenting environment in which the …rm operates. The …rst is the degree to which patent rights are held by a relatively small number of other …rms rather than being widely dispersed. When patent rights are more concentrated, it is less costly for a patentee to contract with other relevant patentholders to conduct its R&D activity, which is referred to by Shapiro (2001) as 'navigating the patent thicket.' The second determinant of enforcement costs is the portfolio size of the …rm relative to …rms with whom it needs to negotiate in order to avoid, or resolve, disputes. Having a larger relative portfolio size puts the …rm in a better bargaining position, and facilitates patent trading (cross licensing) arrangements to resolve disputes without resorting to expensive litigation.
To capture these ideas, we assume that the enforcement cost for …rm 0 is a function of two factors: (1) the number of patents held by …rm 0 relative to …rm ; denoted by x = 0 k 0 k (the bargaining power e¤ect), and (2) the degree of concentration of patents held by …rms in similar technology areas, denoted by c (the patent thicket e¤ect). 4 Formally, we let H = H(x; c), where it is assumed that H x 0; H xx 0; H c 0; H xc 7 0; and H(0; 0) > 0: Relative portfolio size, x; is endogenous since the …rm chooses its patent propensity 0 : We treat the concentration of patents by …rms in similar technology areas, c; as exogenous to the …rm.
By assuming that bargaining power depends on the relative (rather than absolute) number of patents between a …rm and its technology neighbors, we highlight the idea that it might be mutually bene…cial for …rms to reduce their propensities to patent, putting aside the lower level of innovation rents if there was a patent premium. In other words, there may be a prisoner's dilemma aspect to strategic patenting. In the empirical section, we will use the parameter estimates to test whether this prisoner's dilemma actually operates for the software …rms in our sample.
The direct e¤ect of higher concentration of patents among a …rm's technology rivals is to reduce its enforcement costs -that is, H c 0. However, there is also an indirect e¤ect because higher concentration may change the marginal value of accumulating patents to reduce enforcement costs, which is j H x j. This indirect e¤ect can be either positive or negative -it depends on the sign of H xc : We …nd it most plausible that higher concentration of patent rights reduces the marginal value of accumulating patent portfolios -H xc > 0 -because in such cases …rms are more likely to have other ways of 'tacit cooperation' apart from explicit patent trading arrangements. We will investigate the theoretical implications of this hypothesis below and test it in the empirical section.
Firm 0 sets (r 0 ; 0 ) to maximise the value of the …rm:
Recall that k 0 = (r 0 ; r ) also enters the function H(x; c) since x = 0 k 0 k : In this speci…cation we assume that the enforcement cost applies both to patented and unpatented innovations. The idea is that if a …rm has more trading chits in the form of patents, it can also more easily resolve disputes over unpatented innovations. 5 4 Patent concentration is the obverse of the fragmentation of patent rights discussed in the literature on patent thickets. In the next section we discuss the measurement of this variable. 5 An alternative speci…cation is to assume that the enforcement cost is higher for patented innovations. We can do this by expressing unit cost as f 0 + f(1 + ) 0 + (1 0)gH; where > 0. The qualitative predictions in this speci…cation are similar to those in the text.
The …rst order conditions are
where the superscripts on refer to the …rm and subscripts 1 and 2 denote partial derivatives with respect to the di¤erent arguments. The …rst term in equation (2) is the marginal bene…t of R&D net of patent enforcement costs. The second term is the reduction in marginal enforcement cost from increasing the stock of knowledge, holding the patent propensity constant. The sum of these bene…ts must equal the marginal cost of R&D. In equation (3), the …rm's choice of patent propensity trades o¤ the administrative cost of patenting against the increased appropriation of innovation rent due to the patent premium and the reduction in patent enforcement costs due to having a larger patent portfolio.
We analyse the comparative statics of the best response functions of …rm 0; treating the R&D and patenting decisions of rivals as given (Appendix for details). 
Data
Our data set covers the period 1976-1999 and is constructed from three sources. We use Compustat data on public …rms for information on R&D and components of Tobin's Q: value of equities, debt and physical assets. We use a variety of patent data from the U.S. Patent and Technology O¢ ce, including the number of patents granted (dated by year of application), the number of backward and forward citations, U.S. patent classi…cations and the identity of the assignee. 7 In addition to using patent counts in the patent equation, we use these data to construct technological proximity and technological opportunity variables.
We focus on …rms whose patents are predominantly in software. Unfortunately, there is no patent class simply called 'software' so we need a procedure that can sensibly identify software patents. 8 One approach is to do a keyword search on the USPTO database (this is the approach return to patent accumulation in terms of reducing patent enforcement costs. This depends on the sign of the cross-derivative H 0 : Recall the enforcement cost H(x; c) where
Since Hx < 0; we obtain H 0 > 0 provided that Hxx is 'small' (diminishing returns to patent accumulation for enforcement are not too strong). Thus greater patenting by rivals reduces the incentive for a …rm to accumulate patents (recall that Hx < 0). In the appendix on comparative statics, we assume this holds (the resulting predictions are veri…ed in the empirical section).
7 Following the literature, we date patents by their application year because that is more closely tied to measures of R&D and …rm value.
adopted by Bessen and Hunt, 2003) . This can be di¢ cult because many patent applications may contain the word software or other related words but not be primarily about software itself. An arduous alternative is to read each of the (thousands of) potential candidate patents and make a subjective determination on each one (Allison and Tiller, 2003) . A third approach is to base the de…nition on a speci…c set of patent classes -e.g., Graham and Mowery (2003) use the classes most common to well-known software …rms such as Microsoft or Adobe. We adopt a related approach:
we de…ne a software patent as any patent classi…ed by the Patent O¢ ce in International Patent Classi…cation G06F ('Electric Digital Data Processing'). This single class accounts for about half of all patents issued to the largest 100 packaged software companies, as tabulated by the trade publication Softletter (1998) .
Software (G06F) patents are taken out by …rms in many diverse industries (Schankerman and Trajtenberg, 2006) . Moreover, even 'pure' software …rms are likely to patent outside G06F, and may have genuinely non-software patents. The …rm with the highest specialisation in G06F patents for large …rms in our dataset is Microsoft -yet even it has only 71 percent of its patents classi…ed in this category. Therefore, we de…ne a software …rm as one which has at least 45 percent of its patents classi…ed as software (G06F) patents, after normalization by Microsoft's G06F percentage. There are 149 publicly traded software …rms that satisfy this criterion and have R&D and market value data. Of these, 121 …rms have complete data for at least two consecutive years, and these constitute the …nal sample. We use all the patents held by a …rm, both software and non-software, because R&D and market value refer to the entire …rm. The 121 publicly traded …rms in the …nal sample cover the period 1980-99 and include 29,363 patents of which 12,507 are software patents. This sample accounts for about 39 percent of all G06F patents issued to public …rms during this period. 9
About two-thirds of the …rms (82 of 121) are classi…ed in SIC 7372 ('prepackaged software'), the remainder falling into various computer, communications and semi-conductor classes. Appendix 2 provides a list of the …rms in our sample, together with their primary industry (SIC) classi…cation. 9 In the full Compustat data set of public …rms, there are 3441 …rms holding 31,950 G06F patents. More than a third of these patents (12,612) are held by …ve large …rms: IBM, Hitachi, Hewlett Packard, Motorola, and Texas Instruments. Of these …ve …rms, only IBM satis…es the software patent threshold we use (46 percent of its patents are in the G06F class); the others are well below a 30 percent cuto¤. Excluding IBM dramatically reduces the percentage of G06F patents captured by the sample, from 39 percent to only 18 percent. We check robustness of our empirical results by rerunning all of the econometric experiments and computations using a 50 percent threshold to de…ne the sample, which excludes IBM. The results were very similar to those reported in Section 6.
Finally, we must be careful to identify all patents held by each parent …rm for whom we have R&D and value information. A parent …rm may register a patent in its own name or in the name of one of its subsidiaries. The fact that subsidiaries can be bought and sold makes matching the patent to data from the parent …rm more di¢ cult. Hall, Ja¤e, Trajtenberg (2005) matched patent assignees to the parent …rm for patents for the period 1963-99 using 1989 ownership patterns. The resulting database is known as the 'NBER patent database' since it resides at NBER. However, for the group of software …rms in which we are interested (some of which were established in the 1990's), the 1989 match is antiquated. Therefore, for all …rms that recorded at least one software patent between 1980 and 1999, we performed a new match of that …rm to its parent and all its subsidiaries, based on 1999 ownership patterns. We then linked all patents of the subsidiaries to the parent company to produce a consolidated account of patent activity of our sample …rms. For every assignee in the NBER patent database that had at least one G06F patent assigned to it, we checked whether the assignee was a parent …rm or a subsidiary to some parent …rm in 1999. If the …rm was a subsidiary, we treated all patents of that subsidiary to be the patents of the parent …rm. If the assignee was a parent …rm, then we included it in our dataset if three conditions are met: the …rm is publicly traded, we have Compustat data for it, and the …rm meets the 45% G06F-to-total-patents cuto¤, which is our lower limit for calling it a 'software …rm'. Appendix 2 provides details on the how the matching was done. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample.
[ Table 2 about here]
A few points are worth noting. First, the sample …rms are large and R&D intensive. The mean market value is $2.46 billion but the distribution is sharply skewed (median = $97 million). The mean R&D stock is nearly six times as large as the physical capital stock. Second, Tobin's Q is very high, as compared with other industries. This mainly re ‡ects the fact that software …rms use relatively little physical capital as compared to R&D, but also the over-valuation in the high tech bubble of the 1990s. Third, there is substantial variation in the patent propensity of technology rivals (P atprop). It is also worth noting (not reported in the table) that P atprop rose sharply after 1994, after several court decisions signi…cantly weakened the copyright protection previously available to software inventions. 10 The mean P atprop rose from 0.028 in the period 1980-94 to 0.133 for 1995-99. Finally, the 4-…rm citation concentration measure (Citecon) indicates that patent citations are not dramatically fragmented -the sample mean is 0.47, which indicates that …rms cite about eight other …rms, on average. This concentration index does not di¤er between the pre-and post-1994 periods.
Measuring strategic patenting and technology spillovers
While our sample cover only software …rms, these …rms have patenting activity in other technology …elds as well. Thus we need to take into account the potential technology spillovers from R&D done by these …rms in all of their areas of activity. The standard approach (Ja¤e, 1986) is to measure technological proximity between …rms as the uncentered correlation coe¢ cient between their patent distributions across patent classes, and then to measure spillovers as a weighted sum of R&D by other …rms using this proximity measure. We follow a similar approach except that, instead of using the distribution of patenting by each …rm, we use the distribution of a …rm's backward patent citations across di¤erent patent classes to measure technological proximity. The backward patent citations of a …rm i as of period t include all citations to previous patents (except a …rm's own patents) listed in …rm i's patents up to year t. Since the citations in a patent re ‡ect the preceding patents that an inventor is directly drawing on, this approach has strong appeal. To our knowledge this is the …rst time the citations-based proximity measure has been implemented. Formally, let W i = fw ik g K k=1 be the distribution of …rm i 0 s backward citations across patent classes -i.e., w ik is the share of …rm i 0 s total citations to preceding patents that fall into patent class k: Then technological proximity between …rm i and j is ij =
Self-cites are excluded. As a robustness check, we also constructed the standard Ja¤e measure based on the distribution of patents. The cross-…rm correlation between the two technology proximity measures is 0.69 (the econometric results are similar to those we report in Section 6 when we use the patent-based measure).
We measure technology spillovers as the weighted sum of other …rms' R&D stock, G jt , using these technology proximity weights:
The R&D stock is constructed by initialising the stock at the beginning of the sample period and using a 15 percent depreciation rate. 11
To capture the patent portfolio e¤ect of strategic patenting, we compute the weighted average of the 'patent propensity'(the patent-R&D ratio) of other …rms that are rivals in technology space.
The idea is that, given the stock of own R&D and technology spillovers, …rms facing technology rivals with higher patent propensities will …nd themselves at a disadvantage in bargaining over
denote the patent propensity of …rm j;where P S is the stock of patents de…ned in the same way as the R&D stock, G: The patent propensity measure we use is 12
To capture the patent thicket e¤ect of strategic patenting, we want a measure of how many rivals a …rm must negotiate with in order to preserve freedom of operation in its R&D activity. For this purpose, we use a concentration index of a …rm's patent citations -that is, the degree to which patents cited by …rm i (called 'backward citations') are held by relatively few …rms. The idea is that when a …rm's patent citations are more concentrated among a few technology rivals, that …rm will have lower transaction costs in dealing with any patent disputes that may arise. To construct this concentration index of patent citations, we …rst identify the …rm which owns (patent assignee) each patent that …rm i cites in any of the patents it holds as of year t: From this information, we compute the share of …rm i 0 s backward citations that is accounted for by each of its cited …rms.
Self-cites are excluded. We then compute the 4-…rm concentration measure for each …rm in each year (this varies over time as patents are accumulated).
Formally, let s ijt (i 6 = j) denote the share of the total number of citations by …rm i that refer to patents held by …rm j; cumulated up to year t and arranged in descending order. The 4-…rm concentration measure is
We also experimented with two alternative measures -an 8-…rm and a Her…ndahl index of concentration. The econometric results are similar to those reported in Section 6.
5 Econometric Speci…cation
Market Value (Tobin' s-Q) Equation
In the empirical speci…cation, we follow the approach of Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2005) in using three outcome measures -market value, patents and R&D. In this section of the paper we discuss the econometric speci…cation of these equations.
We adopt the representation of the market value function originally proposed by Griliches (1981) :
where V is the market value of the …rm, A is the stock of tangible assets, G is the stock of R&D, and the superscript v indicates that the parameter is for the market value equation. 13 The parameter it is the shadow price of physical capital, and v is the ratio of the shadow price of R&D capital to the shadow price of physical capital. The deviation of V =A ('Tobin's average Q') from unity depends on the ratio of the R&D stock to the tangible capital stock (G=A) and the determinants of it . We parameterize the latter as 14
where v I is a full set of four-digit industry dummies, v t a full set of time dummies, X v it denotes other control variables such as industry demand and technological opportunity (explained below), and v it is an idiosyncratic error term.
The speci…cation of the value function is nonlinear in the parameter v . If (G=A) were 'small,'
; but this will not be adequate for many high tech …rms (Hall and Oriani, 2004) . Therefore, we approximate ln 1
by a higher-order series expansion, which we denote by (G=A): We found that a …fth order polynomial is satisfactory.
Taking these elements together, our basic empirical market value equation is:
We want to emphasise two points about this speci…cation. The …rst point is that the interpretation of the Spillover variable can be di¢ cult because of the re ‡ection problem (Manski, 1991) .
Any variable that shifts the incentive for a …rm to perform R&D and thus its market value will also be likely to a¤ect other …rms that operate in similar technology …elds. Thus a positive correlation between R&D by technology rivals and the market value (or R&D decisions) of a …rm can arise either from genuine technology spillovers or from common, unobserved demand or technology opportunity shocks. Our defences against this problem are: (1) we include controls for demand and technological opportunity (discussed below); (2) the spillover variable is based on stocks of R&D, which should mitigate correlation with contemporaneous shocks; (3) we lag the independent variables, which should also reduce the problem; and (4) we are particularly interested in testing the strategic patenting coe¢ cients v 1 and v 2 ; which should be less directly a¤ected by the re ‡ection problem. These remarks also apply to the patent and R&D equations below.
We control for the e¤ects of demand and technological opportunity in three di¤erent ways. First, we include a full set of year dummies in all speci…cations. Second, we include two lag values of …rm sales to pick up remaining demand shocks. 15 Finally, we construct a measure of technological opportunity as the total patenting in a technology class weighted by …rm i's closeness to that class, as measured by its backward citations. The idea is that …rms cite patents similar in nature to its own, and if there is a large amount of patenting in areas it cites, it is an active technological …eld.
Let W i = fw ik g K k=1 be the distribution of …rm i 0 s backward citations across patent classes (w ik is the share of …rm i 0 s total patent citations to preceding patents that fall in class k), and P S jkt be the patent stock of …rm j in class k at time t: We de…ne technological opportunity for …rm i
Two lagged values of T echopp are included in the regression equations. 16 The second point about the speci…cation involves …rm …xed e¤ects. Since the software …rms in our sample are classi…ed into di¤erent SIC industries, we include four-digit industry dummies to pick up unobserved heterogeneity. Ideally we would want to include …xed …rm e¤ects in the speci…cation, but when did so we found that it very hard to pin down any of the coe¢ cients of interest. In a recent paper, Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg (2005) reach a similar conclusion. The reason is that going to the 'within-…rm'dimension means that we are trying to explain variation over time in market value (around the …rm mean), which can be very noisy. In a …rst-di¤erenced speci…cation, the variation over time would be very close to unpredictable, under the e¢ cient markets hypothesis. 17
The 'within-…rm'estimator is not equivalent to …rst-di¤erences, so it is possible in some samples to exploit …xed …rm e¤ects successfully (this depends on the time series properties of the data).
Using a much broader sample of …rms, Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2005) are able to 1 5 We also constructed an industry sales measure for each …rm, equal to a weighted average of the sales in each of the four-digit SIC classes in which the …rm operates. The weights are constructed from Compustat information on the distribution of …rm sales across SIC classes during the period 1993-2001. Results using this control are similar.
1 6 We also experimented with measures using citations rather than patents, and ‡ows rather than stock measures. Empirical results were similar to those reported in the text.
1 7 Strictly speaking, under the (weak form) e¢ cient market hypothesis, the market value in period t should not be predictable with information publicly available at t 1: estimate a market value equation with …xed …rm e¤ects, but in the current study we are not able to do so.
Following Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg (2005) , we also estimate an extended version of the model that allows for the stock market to value the patents held by a …rm, above and beyond its valuation of the …rm's R&D. There are basically two reasons such a patent premium may be present. First, patenting may enhance the ability of the …rm to appropriate rents from any given innovation outputs, relative to alternative methods of protection. Second, patents contain (noisy) information about innovation output and as such may contain additional information about the expected pro…t stream of the …rm, above and beyond measures of R&D input. 18 It is important to include the stock of R&D in the estimating equation, however, since some innovations may not be patented.
The extended speci…cation of the model treats the stock of patents, denoted by P S; in the same way as the stock of R&D:
where we expect v > 0 if there is a patent premium in the stock market. For estimation we approximate this term by adding a (…fth order) polynomial (P S=A) to equation (10). 19
Patent Equation
Because patents are counts, we use a version of the negative binomial count data model that allows for …xed e¤ects. 20 The …rst moment of the estimator is
1 8 A related interpretation is worth noting. Given the costs involved, we expect patents to be taken out on the more valuable innovations, other things equal. Thus the patent premium may re ‡ect the additonal market value associated with above-average quality R&D.
1 9 We do not include an additional polynomial in the interaction term
because it is too demanding on the available data.
Writing this …rst moment as E(P it jX it ) = exp(x 0 it p ), for shorthand, the variance is V (P it ) = exp(x 0 it p ) + exp(2x 0 it p ) where the parameter is a measure of over-dispersion. The Poisson model restricts the mean to equal the variance, which corresponds to the special case = 0. The Negative Binomial estimator relaxes this assumption (empirically, overdispersion is important in our data). We estimate the model by maximum likelihood. We allow for unobserved …rm heterogeneity using the approach developed by Blundell, Gri¢ th and Windmeijer (2002) and Blundell, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (2003) This uses pre-sample information on patents to control for heterogeneity. The alternative approach of Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) , using conditional maximum likelihood, is only consistent for strictly exogenous regressors, which does not hold for our speci…cation.
R&D Equation
We write the R&D equation as:
where r i is a full set of …rm dummies, r t a full set of time dummies, X r it denotes other control variables such as industry demand, and r it is an idiosyncratic error term. In the R&D equation
we include …xed …rm e¤ects to capture unobserved heterogeneity. 21 This speci…cation allows for dynamics in R&D investment by including a lagged dependent variable. As in the market value equation, unobserved, transitory shocks to demand are captured by the time dummies and a distributed lag of …rm sales, and …rm level variables on the right hand side of the R&D equation are lagged by one period to mitigate endogeneity problems.
2 1 The time dimension of the company panel is relatively long, so the 'within groups bias' on weakly endogenous variables (Nickell, 1981 ) is likely to be small. The average number of continuous time series observations is 9.1 (median is 7.0).
Empirical Results

Market Value Equation
[ Table 3 about here] Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for the market value equation. The basic speci…cation in column 1 strongly supports the predictions of the model. First, not surprisingly we …nd that a …rm's (lagged) R&D stock is strongly related to its market value. Using the coe¢ cients on the polynomial in G=A; we …nd that a 10 percent increase in the stock of R&D is associated with a 8.4 percent increase in value. Evaluated at the sample means, this implies that an extra $1 of R&D generates an increase of 96 cents in market value. 22 This estimate for software …rms is very similar to previous studies that do not focus on software -e.g., Hall, Ja¤e & Trajtenberg (2005) estimate a marginal return to R&D of 86 cents. However, as we show below, this …gure underestimates the full marginal return to R&D for sotftware …rms because there is a large indirect return in the form of a patent premium on innovation output.
The second …nding is that R&D by technology-related rivals generates positive spillovers that are valued by the stock market. The coe¢ cient on Spillover is positive and statistically signi…cant, implying that a 10 percent increase in the pool of technology spillovers is associated with a 1.7 percent increase in a …rm's market value. In absolute terms, the coe¢ cient implies that $1 of additional Spillover is associated with an increase in market value of 13 cents. In other words, an extra dollar of technology spillover is worth (in terms of market value) about 13 percent as much as a dollar of own R&D for these software …rms. This estimate of the impact of technology spillovers (relative to own R&D) is larger than previous estimates that are based on samples covering a range of di¤erent industries (e.g., Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 2005; Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen, 2005) , which is consistent with the widely-held view that cumulative innovation is particularly important in software.
We now turn to the e¤ect of the strategic patenting variables. The third …nding is that …rms which face technological rivals with higher patent propensities have lower market value. The coef-2 2 We compute the elasticity of market value with respect to R&D stock as eV G = …cient on P atprop is negative and statistically signi…cant, implying that a 10 percent increase in rivals'patent propensity reduces a …rm's value by 1.3 percent.
The fourth …nding is that …rms whose patent citations are more concentrated in fewer technology rivals have systematically higher market value. This …nding is consistent with the hypothesis that higher concentration of patent rights should reduce the transactions costs of settling patent disputes. The coe¢ cient on Citecon is statistically signi…cant and implies that a …ve percentage point increase in the four-…rm citation concentration ratio (this is a 10 percent increase at the sample mean) would raise market value by 1.7 percent. These two …ndings strongly support the model's predictions about strategic patenting -there is evidence both that patent portfolio size (bargaining power) and transaction costs associated with the fragmentation of property rights a¤ect the market value of …rm.
Finally, the coe¢ cients on the …rm sales and technological opportunity variables show that market value is positively related to the growth in demand and the growth in technological opportunity, as measured by aggregate patenting activity in the patent classes in which the …rm operates. This is con…rmed by noting that the estimated coe¢ cients on the …rst and second lags of …rm sales are nearly equal in magnitude but opposite in sign. The same holds for the coe¢ cients on the …rst and second lags of the T echopp variable.
The basic speci…cation relates market value to the …rm's stock of R&D, as a proxy for knowledge. Since …rms typically do not patent all of their innovation output, R&D input is more a more encompassing measure of knowledge than simply using patents. However, as Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg (2005) point out, there may also be a patent premium in the stock market for those innovations that the …rm chooses to patent -i.e., their private value would be less if not patented.
To test this for software …rms, we add to the empirical speci…cation a (…fth-order) polynomial in the ratio of the patent stock to stock of …xed assets (denoted by P S=A), analogously to our treatment of R&D (column 2). We …nd clear evidence of a patent premium. Using the estimated coe¢ cients on the polynomial in P S=A (evaluating at the sample means), we compute an elasticity of market value with respect to the stock of patents, denoted by e V;P S , at 0.31 -a 10 percent increase in the patent stock is associated with a 3.1 percent rise in market value, holding the stock of R&D constant. 23 In this extended speci…cation, we also estimate an elasticity of market value with respect to the R&D stock, denoted by e V G ; at 0.71. Taken together, these …ndings imply constant returns to scale in the value equation -a 10 percent increase in both the stocks of R&D and patents is associated with about a 10.2 percent increase in market value. Nonetheless, allowing for a patent premium in the speci…cation of the market value equation has almost no e¤ect on the other coe¢ cients in the model -in particular, the coe¢ cients on the technology spillovers and strategic patenting variables remain virtually unchanged.
As we indicated earlier, the full return to an increase in R&D includes both the direct market valuation of R&D plus the indirect return through the patent premium. Formally, we can express the total elasticity of market value with respect to R&D stock as E V G = e V G + e V;P S e P S;G : We use the parameter estimates on the polynomial terms in G=A and P S=A (column 2 in Table 3 ) to compute the elasticities e V G and e V;P S : To get the elasticity of patents with respect to R&D, e P S;G , we use the coe¢ cients estimated in the patent equation which are presented later (column 2 in Table   4 ). This computation yields the following decomposition: E V G = 0:71 + 0:31 x 0:60 = 0:90. That is, once we account for both the direct impact of R&D and the e¤ect through the patent premium, a 10 percent increase in the stock of R&D raises market value by 9.0 percent. From this we conclude that the patent premium accounts for 21 percent of the total elasticity e¤ect of R&D (= 0:31 x 0:60=0:90). 24 This …nding shows that patents are important as a means of appropriating innovation rents in software.
One other interesting implication of the empirical results is worth noting. We found patenting by its technology rivals reduces a …rm's market value (the coe¢ cient on P atprop is negative). As we pointed out in the introduction, however, some researchers (e.g., Bessen and Maskin, 2000) have suggested that patent regimes in complex technology industries may create a prisoner's dilemma in which …rms could be better o¤ by collectively reducing their levels of patenting. In our context, 2 3 We compute the elasticity of market value with respect to patent stock as eV;P S = P S A 0 (
P S A
) where 0 is the derivative of the polynomial . It is interesting to note that Hall and MacGarvie (2006) , using a very di¤erent sample (covering …rms doing any software patenting, rather than 'software' …rms as we de…ne them) estimate an elasticity of market value with respect to patents per R&D dollar of 0.3, which is very similar to our …nding.
2 4 We can also do the decomposition in terms of the marginal return to R&D (instead of elasticities). Note that ; where the last three terms constitute the patent premium. We compute the …rst three derivatives from the estimated coe¢ cients of the polynomial and : Using the relationship between the stock and ‡ow of patents, we get
where r and are the real interest rate and depreciation rate (we set r = :05; = :15). We …nd that the patent premium accounts for 25 percent of the full marginal return to R&D.
this hypothesis implies that a proportional increase in patenting by all …rms would reduce the market value of the individual …rm, holding R&D for all …rms constant. In Table 3 , this requires that the sum of the coe¢ cient on P atprop and the elasticity on own patent stock (computed from the polynomial in P S=A) should be negative. The parameter estimates do not support this claim -using the estimates from column 2, we …nd that the sum of these elasticities is positive ( 0:12 + 0:31 = 0:19):
The scope of software patent protection was gradually increased, and that of software copyright protection reduced, in a series of court decisions during the 1980s, culminating in two key decisions in 1994 and 1995 (for case references, see note 10). These decisions made it increasingly desirable for …rms to protect software algorithms using patents rather than by copyright as they had done previously. As noted in the introduction, this led to a sharp increase in software patenting. We want to investigate whether the changes in patent policy toward software raised the shadow price on patents and R&D, or increased the importance of the strategic patenting variables. To examine this, we re-estimated the market value equation separately for the pre-1994 and post-1994 periods (columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 ). 25 There is no evidence that the shadow price of R&D changed as a result of the change in patent regime. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients on R&D are the same in both periods (p-value = 0:20). However, we strongly reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients on patents remained constant over the two periods (p-value < :01). Nonetheless, the elasticity of market value with respect to the stock of patents, implied by the coe¢ cients, does not change very much between periods -it is estimated at 0.50 in the 1980-94 period and 0.39 for 1995-99.
Similarly, the estimated marginal value of a patent is not sharply di¤erent between the periods -$5.3 million versus $3.9 million. However, we …nd that the coe¢ cients on both strategic patenting variables increased substantially in the post-1994 period. The point estimates of the P atprop and Citecon coe¢ cients are not statistically di¤erent from zero in the earlier period, but in the later period they are both larger (in absolute value) and statistically signi…cant.
In summary, we conclude that the change in patent regime was associated with a sharp increase in the importance (as measured by the coe¢ cients) of the strategic patenting variables. At the same time, despite a large increase in the level of patenting during this later period, we do not …nd a sharp reduction in the impact of patents on market value. Evidently, whatever diminishing returns that was associated with the intensi…cation of software patenting appears to have been largely countervailed by the increased value from the strengthening of software patent protection.
Patent Equation
[ Table 4 about here] Table 4 presents the results for the patent equation. 26 In the regressions we allow for unobserved …rm heterogeneity using the approach developed by Blundell, Gri¢ th and Windmeijer (2002) which conditions on pre-sample patent counts. 27 The alternative approach of Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) for including …rm …xed e¤ects is only consistent for strictly exogenous regressors, which does not hold for our speci…cation.
Not surprisingly, we …nd that patenting is signi…cantly related to the …rm's stock of R&D, but there are sharp decreasing returns both in the model without and with the control for unobserved …rm heterogeneity (columns 1 and 2). Note that the coe¢ cient on the pre-sample patents variable is positive and statistically signi…cant (this holds in all speci…cations), which con…rms that unobserved …rm heterogeneity in patenting behaviour is important. Using the speci…cation with the pre-sample control, the elasticity of patents with respect to the R&D stock is 0.60 and statistically signi…cant. This …nding is broadly in line with the extensive empirical literature on patent production functions. 28 Also note that the coe¢ cients on our measures of technological opportunity (T echopp) are surprising -they suggest that the growth in 'technological opportunity'reduces current patenting (the coe¢ cients are about equal in magnitude and opposite in sign). But recall that T echopp measures the aggregate patent activity in the patent classes in which the …rm operates.
Thus the estimated coe¢ cients point to a '…shing out'interpretation -when aggregate patenting growth is higher, the …rm is less likely to generate patented innovations from its stock of R&D. 29 We now turn to the key variables of interest. Overall, the empirical results support the hypothesis that both technology spillovers and strategic patenting variables a¤ect the decision to patent.
First, we …nd strong R&D spillovers in patenting once we control for unobserved …rm heterogeneity (column 2). The coe¢ cient on Spillover is positive and highly signi…cant. The spillover e¤ect is substantial: a ten percent increase in technology spillovers is associated with a 6.4 percent increase in patenting, holding the …rm's own R&D stock constant.
Second, we …nd evidence that …rms do less patenting, conditional on their R&D, when they face technology rivals with higher patent propensities. The point estimate on P atprop is negative and strongly signi…cant in the speci…cation with the pre-sample patents control. This …nding is consistent with the view that …rms are in a worse bargaining position in resolving patent disputes with rivals that have large patent portfolios, which thereby reduces the pro…tability of patenting.
The e¤ect is substantial -the point estimate implies that a 10 percent increase in the average patent propensity of technology rivals is associated with a reduction in patenting by the …rm of 4.5 percent.
Third, there is strong evidence that greater concentration of citations (lower patent transaction costs) a¤ects the level of patenting. Greater citations concentration is associated with a statistically signi…cant reduction in patenting by the …rm. This …nding is consistent with the evidence for semiconductors from Ziedonis (2003a) , who …nds that greater fragmentation (lower concentration) of patent rights increases patenting, conditional on R&D. In the context of our model, this …nding implies that greater concentration reduces the marginal value of accumulating a patent portfolio in order to enforce patent rights (in the model, H xc > 0):The point estimates are nearly identical, and statistically signi…cant, in the speci…cations without and with the the pre-sample patent control.
The e¤ect is large -for example, the point estimate in column (2) implies that a 5 percentage point increase in citations concentration (equivalent to a 10 percent increase at the sample mean) reduces patenting by 12.8 percent.
As with the market value equation, we want to test whether the change in judicial treatment of software patentability increased the impact of patent portfolios or patent thickets on patenting behaviour. To examine this hypothesis, we estimate the patent equation separately for the pre-1994 and post-1994 periods (columns 3 and 4). The key results on R&D spillovers and the strategic patenting variables hold for both sub-periods, but we do not …nd any signi…cant change between the two periods. While the point estimates on Spillover and Citecon are larger in the later sub-period, and the coe¢ cient on P atprop is lower, the di¤erences are not statistically signi…cant.
R&D Equation
[ Table 5 about here] Finally, we turn to the parameter estimates for alternative speci…cations of the R&D equation.
Overall, the results (Table 5) provide support for the hypothesis that the strategic patenting variables -especially the concentration of patent rights, Citecon -a¤ect the R&D decision. We discuss each of the key …ndings in turn, looking across the speci…cations to check robustness.
First, we do not …nd strong evidence that technology spillovers a¤ect the R&D decision, once we control for …rm …xed e¤ects. In the static speci…cation with industry …xed e¤ects, but not …rm e¤ects (column 1), we get a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient on the Spillover variable (elasticity of 0.21). This also holds when we add dynamics to the speci…cation without …xed e¤ects (column 2), the implied long run elasticity of technology spillovers rising to 0.40. However, when we add …xed …rm e¤ects either to the static or dynamic speci…cation (columns 3 and 4, respectively), the point estimate of the spillovers coe¢ cient becomes negative but statistically insigni…cant. 30 Moreover, the …rm …xed e¤ects are jointly signi…cant (p-value <.001). As an empirical matter, R&D at the …rm level is highly persistent and one needs either …rm e¤ects or dynamics in the speci…cation to capture it. Picking up this persistence with dynamics allows us to pin down a positive e¤ect of technology spillovers, but not if we use …xed e¤ects. However, we emphasize that this …nding that technology spillovers do not a¤ect the R&D decision is consistent with the model -it indicates that such spillovers do not materially a¤ect the marginal product of own R&D. Nonetheless, recall from Sections 6.1 and 6.2 that spillovers strongly increase the number of patents and market value, indicating that such spillovers do raise the average product of the recipient …rm's R&D.
Second, there is only mixed evidence that R&D investment is a¤ected by the patent propensities of technology rivals. While the point estimates of coe¢ cient on P atprop are negative, as predicted by the model, and robust to introducing dynamics and …xed …rm e¤ects in the model (columns 2 and 3, respectively), they are not generally statistically signi…cant. Thus it does not appear that patent portfolio accumulation by technology rivals is an important deterrent to doing R&D.
However, the R&D decision is signi…cantly a¤ected by the degree of concentration of patent rights, i.e., by the level of patent transaction costs. In the static model without …xed e¤ects (column 1), we …nd that greater citations concentration (Citecon) is associated with a statistically signi…cant reduction in R&D. This result holds up when we introduce dynamics or …xed …rm e¤ects in the regression (columns 2 and 3, respectively), and the size of the e¤ect is substantial. In the static speci…cation with …xed e¤ects, the estimate implies that a 5 percentage point increase in citations concentration (this is a 10 percent increase at the sample mean) reduces R&D by 1.4 percent (the implied long run impact of this change in the dynamic speci…cation is much larger, at 4.2 percent). As before, however, when we introduce both …xed e¤ects and dynamics the point estimate is broadly similar but no longer statistically signi…cant.
In the model, the e¤ects of higher concentration of patent rights on the level of R&D and patents are ambiguous. The direction of the e¤ect depends on how citations concentration a¤ects the marginal value of having a larger patent portfolio in order to enforce patent rights (i.e., on the cross derivative of the patent enforcement cost function, H xc ): As explained in Section 2, our …nding that higher concentration of patent rights reduces R&D implies that H xc > 0: This means that there is a smaller gain from having a larger patent portfolio when patent rights are more concentrated among rival …rms. This …nding is consistent with our expectations, since tacit forms of cooperation are more likely to develop in such cases and these make large patent portfolios less important as threats to resolve disputes.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the coe¢ cients of the time dummies show no evidence that R&D changed systematically over the sample period. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients on the year dummies are jointly zero in any of the speci…cations of the model. This …nding suggests that the expansion of patentability over software during the 1980s and early 1990s
was not associated with any major changes in R&D investment by these software …rms as of the end of our sample period. Whether the expansion of software patentability will eventually intensify innovation incentives remains an important, but open, question. Nonetheless, we emphasise that our …ndings contradict the controversial claim by Bessen and Hunt (2003) that the expansion of software patenting led …rms to reduce R&D over this period. Table 6 concisely summarizes our main …ndings on market value, patents and R&D by comparing the predictions from the model with the empirical results from Tables 3-5. There is a close match between the theoretical predictions and the empirical …ndings for the key technology spilllover variable (Spillover) and the strategic patenting variables (P atprop and Citecon).
[ Table 6 about here]
Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of strategic patenting and technology spillovers on R&D investment, patenting activity and market value of …rms in the computer software industry. Software is a classic example of a complex technology in which cumulative innovation plays a central role, and where there is growing concern that patent thickets may impede innovation. We develop a model to analyse and estimate the impact of strategic patenting and technology spillovers. The model incorporates two distinct aspects of strategic patenting -patent portfolio size (patent propensity) to capture the …rm's bargaining power in patent disputes and licensing, and concentration of patent rights among rivals to capture the transaction costs of enforcing patent rights. Using panel data for the period 1980-99, we …nd clear evidence that strategic patenting and technology spillovers are present.
There are four key empirical …ndings in the paper. First, there are large, positive technology spillovers from R&D for software …rms. Second, we …nd that patenting by technology rivals reduces the …rm's R&D investment, patenting and market value. Third, greater concentration (less fragmentation) of patent rights among rivals reduces both R&D and patenting by the …rm -re ‡ecting less need to have an arsenal of patents to resolve disputes when there are fewer players -but it increases market value because transaction costs are lower. Finally, we …nd that there is a large patent premium in the stock market valuation of these software …rms, which accounts for about twenty percent of the overall private returns to R&D investments.
Appendix 1. Comparative Statics
where superscripts on functions and refer to the …rm and subscripts 1 and 2 denote partial derivatives with respect to the di¤erent arguments. To simplify notation, we supress the arguments in functions, but it should be borne in mind that H = H( where, using the …rst order conditions and after considerable algebra, we obtain the following expressions: In addition, using the envelop theorem we get the following results for the value of the …rm:
3 1 Using the …rst order condition for 0 ;we obtain
which is positive if 0 1 >> 2 and Hxx is su¢ ciently small (i.e., elasticity of Hx.is less than unity). 3 2 If there is no spillover e¤ect ( 2 = 12 = 22 = 0); we get Vr 0 r > 0: If we have spillovers but no strategic patenting e¤ect (Hx = Hxx = 0); we also get Vr 0 r > 0; provided dimimishing returns in the pro…t function are not too large.
Appendix 2. Construction of the Sample
We began with two main data sets: the CorpTech data (purchased from Corporate Technology Information Services) and the G06F ('software') patent database. The CorpTech data cover more than 15,000 companies (parent companies and subsidiaries) which report some involvement in a software-related activity (product classi…cation) over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . Of the …rms covered by CorpTech, 12 percent are publicly traded …rms. We focus exclusively on public …rms in order to use market value and other balance sheet information for the empirical analysis.
The …rst step was to match subsidiaries to their parent companies. Subsidiaries and parent …rms are identi…ed in the CorpTech data by 'type of ownership'variables. The CorpTech data set includes the …rm identi…er (CUSIP), but this information was missing for many …rms. All public companies with missing CUSIP's were checked manually (primarily from company websites) and the information was added where available.
The second step was to match the …rms in CorpTech (both parents and subsidiaries) to the assignees in the G06F patent database. This …rst required that we get the CUSIP for the assignee of each G06F patent. This was done by matching the G06F patent number to the NBER database. The next step was to match the G06F patents to the CorpTech database using the company CUSIP.
This matching was done under the supervision of Josh Lerner at the Harvard Business School. The matching was done for each CorpTech …rm using name recognition software and followed up by two independent rounds of manual checks (one under Josh Lerner and the other by Irina Danilkina of the Law and Economics Consulting Group).. For this study, we need to match the data for the public …rms in CorpTech to all of their patents, not just their G06F patents. In principle, this could be done by matching the CorpTech and NBER patent data, using the CUSIP in each data set. The NBER data include all USPTO patents (up to 1999) and CUSIP numbers from the Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg (2004) match, which is based on publicly registered …rms in 1989. However, for our purposes this match is antiquated, given the substantial entry and rapid growth of the software industry in the 1990s. We found 1,198 public …rms with CUSIP's in CorpTech that do not show up in the NBER dataset. These are …rms that were born or became public after 1989. So while the second step above provides a good match of …rms and their G06F patents, there remained no reliable match of …rms to their non-software patents. If we were to use this match and include all …rms with at least one G06F patent, there would be 70 …rms with a total of 18,628 software patents and 127,553 total patents. The vast majority of these …rms have very low software to total patent ratios. Using our 45% software to all patent ratio cuto¤, we would be left with only 15 …rms covering 11,561 software patents and 28,041 total patents. Using the 50% cuto¤ (which excludes IBM), there would remain 14 …rms with 4,905 software patents and 8,736 total patents.
It is clear that the match using the 1989 ownership patterns in the NBER patent database was outdated for our purposes, as many software …rms were established or became public after 1989.
Thus the third step was to do a new match between the CorpTech and NBER databases. The focus was to identify patents in the NBER database whose assignees were public …rms either born or becoming public after 1989. The matching was done manually, as follows. For each of the 1,198 public companies in the CorpTech data with CUSIP numbers that do not appear in the NBER data, we searched the NBER database for matching assignees. This match was done using the 'Soundex'command in SAS to …nd similar sounding names (including spellings, di¤erent abbreviations etc.). This procedure yielded 514 additional name matches. Because many similar sounding names may not be the same …rms at all (e.g., Andromedia vs Andromeda, FoundryNetworks vs.FoundryManagement etc.), each name that di¤ered was manually checked (using company websites) to see if the 'matched'companies were in fact the same. Fifty of the 514 provisional matches were discarded, leaving 464 con…rmed …rm matches. Finally, for all these …rms, both the names of the parent and all its subsidiaries were checked in the NBER patent assignee list. This procedure results in the …nal sample of 445 …rms with at least one G06F patent. We then applied the 45% threshold for the ratio of G06F to total patents in order to identify what we call 'software …rms'.
This yielded the …nal sample of 121 …rms used in the paper. Notes: 'IC' denotes the pre-sample control for initial conditions. Estimation is based on the Negative Binomial model. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity. Dummy variables are included for observations where Citecon or lagged patent flow is zero. The initial conditions in columns (2)-(4) are estimated with 'pre-sample mean scaling approach' of Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) . * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level. Table 5 ). * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level.
APPENDIX TABLE LIST OF SAMPLE FIRMS (FIRST HALF)
Cusip SIC Company Name Cusip SIC Company Name
